Nothing happened because Head had reported on 15 May 1965 to his minister, Arthur Bottomley, that
“some of UMNO would like to warm things up to the extent that they might find a pretext for what they term ‘dealing with’ and I mean locking up Lee. I stressed that Lee has now quite an international reputation and that, unless there were cast-iron grounds for ‘dealing’ with him, such a course would do Malaysia great damage. Although the Tunku said nothing, I have a feeling there is some plot in the back of their minds.”
On 17 May, a note was sent to the Commonwealth Relations Office that the prime minister had read the telegram, had underlined the last sentence and minuted: “On X (the quote above), if there is a plot, I hope the Tunku realises this would mean an agonising reappraisal for us. H.W.”
On 1 June, Head cabled that he had asked the Tunku if he could still treat with Lee Kuan Yew and bring about some kind of détente.
“The Tunku said no, he was determined never again to try and treat with Lee Kuan Yew, whom he did not trust a yard and about whom he was completely disillusioned. I said how was all this going to end, to which the Tunku replied ‘I know my duty and I shall not hesitate to do it.’
“This sounded sinister, so I thought it was a good moment to dive in and said that among other things the British government were very worried to have heard about discussion in the press concerning Lee Kuan Yew being put inside. Was the Tunku referring to this? He said that he was.
“I said that if Lee Kuan Yew were put inside for any reason other than for treasonable activities, it would much shock and embarrass the British government and would undoubtedly have far-reaching effects among world opinion.
“When I said that I thought that such a step, if done without due cause, might bring a serious reappraisal of Britain’s attitude to Malaysia, he said ‘very well then, I should have to make peace with Indonesia.’ …
“An hour after I had seen the Tunku, Lee Kuan Yew came to my house. I found him in a very emotional state. I told him that I was deeply worried about present course of events. It seemed to me that unless an initiative were taken present course could only lead to two directions. One was increasing political bitterness and controversy leading to intensification of communal tension and strife; the other would be situation in which federal government felt that increasing political tension could not continue unchecked and might therefore lead to Lee’s detention. I felt that some way must be found to avoid continuation of present trend and its seemingly inevitable consequences. Lee said that time had now come to fight for a Malaysia that would not be dominated by Malays. This, in his view, was why he had created new opposition grouping and if federal government decided to put him inside he would welcome it because it would strengthen his position.
“Lee said time for patience and delay was over and that anyway he had gone too far now to adopt such a course. There is, unfortunately, both truth and force in Lee’s reply. …
“Without, I hope, being over-dramatic, it is my view that we are now confronted with a serious crisis. Unless something can be done to take heat out of present situation course we are now following will, I think, eventually bring about serious trouble.”
The Commonwealth Relations Office message to Head on 3 June said:
“If Lee were arrested, it could not be assumed that this step would quietly be accepted in Singapore. The Tunku may have other indications, but in our view there is every risk of serious trouble there, which might well affect the Borneo territories. … Should the situation following Lee’s arrest so seriously deteriorate as to require the use of British troops in Singapore, it would be extremely difficult to secure the understanding and support of British public opinion.”
On 4 June, Head reported on his meeting with the Tunku:
“Reading between the lines it became evident that the Tunku has told his people to make enquiries to see if there is any chance of displacing Lee from PAP leadership and getting a prominent alternative PAP leader to take over from Lee. Lee is already aware of this and had already told me about it. I told the Tunku I had little hope for this manoeuvre. He then said, ‘Tell your government not to worry. This is an internal situation which I have got to settle. You must not get involved in our internal affairs. Americans did in Vietnam and look what a mess they made of it.’”
On June 5, Head received a telegram:
“The prime minister has seen telegram No. 960 of June 1 … He has made two comments:
(1) Should I send a message to the Tunku?
(2) Should High Commissioner quietly suggest to Lee he gets lost (goes abroad) for a week or two. We do not want him put inside before PMs’ Conference.
H.W.”
Thereafter there were few new developments for Head to report. The Tunku was away in London and Razak was quietly talking to Keng Swee about Singapore “hiving off”.
Soon after the separation, on 21 September, George Thomson, the British Commonwealth secretary, sent this message about it to Lord Caradon (Hugh Foot), the UK representative to the United Nations:
“Our general comment is that, however provocative Lee may have been from time to time … nevertheless it is likely that the present break-up and the preceding tension could have been avoided if the Tunku and the Malays had shown some reasonable flexibility in their relations with Lee and Singapore.”
Thomson, a Scotsman, did not understand the Malay mind. Neither did I at first, even though I had lived with them all my life. I did not realise how deep were their suspicions of the immigrant races, especially the Chinese, and their fears of being overwhelmed. They had to be totally in charge of the powers of the state, especially the police and the army. Any compromise must be on their terms.
The Tunku, in an interview in 1982 with a British researcher, said that he could not recollect any warning from Wilson, but admitted he had been under considerable pressure to sanction my arrest. He added, however:
“There was no point in arresting Kuan Yew because the Chinese would, in my part of the world, have also been in sympathy with him because he was Chinese. I did not want trouble because of him, just because of Singapore. If you have a bad leg, the best thing is to amputate it. That is what I did. … I knew that Kuan Yew would be the best man to take over the government of Singapore. … His ambitions knew no bounds (in Malaysia).”
There were other considerations. If we had remained in Malaysia, the commission of inquiry into the 1964 race riots would continue to hear damaging evidence against Ja’afar Albar and UMNO, which would receive widespread publicity. Then there would be the hearing of my libel action against Albar and the editors of the Utusan Melayu, who would be thoroughly cross-examined in court on all the incendiary passages they had published about me. That would mean a devastating exposure of key UMNO leaders’ methods of incitement to racism and bloody riots.
The Tunku’s solution to these problems was separation. Singapore would be out of Malaysia and he would control Singapore through the supply of water from Johor and other levers of pressure. He told Head on 9 August, “If Singapore’s foreign policy is prejudicial to Malaysia’s interests, we could always bring pressure to bear on them by threatening to turn off the water in Johor.” Head commented to Bottomley that this was “a startling proposal of how to coordinate foreign policy”.
Also on 9 August itself, the Tunku told Tom Critchley, the Australian high commissioner, “We hold the upper hand and Singapore will have to consult with us in dealing with foreign governments.”
The Tunku and Razak thought they could station troops in Singapore, squat on us and if necessary close the Causeway and cut off our water supply. They believed, not without foundation, that Singapore could not exist on its own – what better authority than the speeches of the PAP leaders themselves, myself included, and the reasons we had given for it? As Ghazali bin Shafie, the permanent secretary, external affairs ministry, said soon after separation, after a few years out on a limb, Singapore would be in severe straits and would come crawling back – this time on Malaysia’s terms.
No, not if I could help it. People in Singapore were in no mood to crawl back after what they had been through for two years in Malaysia, the communal bullying and intimidation. Certainly Keng Swee and I, the two directly responsible for accepting this separation from our hinterland, were not about to give up. The people shared our feelings and were prepared to do whatever was needed to make an independent Singapore work. I did not know I was to spend the rest of my life getting Singapore not just to work but to prosper and flourish.